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THE ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE: APPROACHENG ABSOLUTE
IMMUNI[TY?-SHELTON v. AMERICAN
MOTORS CORP.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") pro-
vide for liberal pretrial discovery which contemplates full disclo-
sure of all relevant, non-privileged facts.1 In accordance with the
Federal Rules governing discovery, the work product of an attor-
ney, prepared in anticipation of litigation, is protected against un-
necessary intrusion.2 Consequently, there have been numerous at-
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Rule 26(b)(1) provides for "discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevent to the subject matter involved in the pending action...
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Discovery provisions have been liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964) (Rules 26-37 must be broadly inter-
preted to carry out their intended purpose); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery Rules require disclosure of facts to fullest extent practica-
ble); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (deposition and discovery rules must be
liberally construed). In Hickman, Justice Murphy summarized the purposes of the new dis-
covery procedure as follows:
[Rules 26-37] restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest
the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The
various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,
and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501.
Under Rule 26(a), "[p]arties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following
methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories;
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for
inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admis-
sion." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) provides in part: "In ordering discovery...
the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id.
Rule 26(b)(3) codifies the work product doctrine first enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), advisory committee's note of 1970.
In Hickman, the Supreme Court recognized the need to protect an attorney's work
product stating that:
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation
of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
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tempts to apply this work product protection to prevent revelation
of crucial information otherwise discoverable under the Federal
Rules.3 Notwithstanding these attempts to thwart the discovery
process, federal courts confronting the issue have consistently al-
lowed litigants to discover at least the existence of related facts to
ensure the most comprehensive judicial review and equitable dis-
position of the action at bar.4 Recently, however, in Shelton v.
American Motors Corp.,5 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the attorney work product doctrine bars inquiry into
an attorney's knowledge of the existence or non-existence of cer-
be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference .... This work is reflected, of
course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental im-
pressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways...
termed ... the "work product of the lawyer."
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
To be protected, the work product must be prepared in anticipation of litigation. See,
e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (preparation of case deserves protection); First Wis. Mort-
gage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 165 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (work product remains
protected for subsequent suits); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515-16 (D.
Conn.) (prospect of litigation must be identifiable), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir.
1976).
The work product doctrine also protects materials prepared for previous or terminated
litigation. See In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulin-
age et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997
(1975); see also Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and Carry-Over Immunity: An
Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U. Pirr. L. REv. 675, 681-702 (1986) (discussing ra-
tionale for carry-over immunity).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 1969) (work
product inapplicable to request for names and addresses of those who supplied privileged
information), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973); LaRocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (work product doctrine does not protect party
from disclosing existence and location of documents); Cedolia v. C.S. Hill Saw Mills, Inc., 41
F.R.D. 524, 526 (M.D.N.C. 1967) (work product doctrine does not protect names and ad-
dresses of witnesses or documents relating to the lawsuit); Lance, Inc. v. Ginsburg, 32 F.R.D.
51, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (fact upon which allegations in complaint are based not protected by
work product doctrine even though solely within attorney's knowledge); Gaynor v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 8 F.R.D. 302, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (interrogatory requesting attorney's
knowledge of facts obtained from witness interviews not protected by work product rule).
Cf. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302-05 (1978) (modern discovery rules designed to promote
sharing of evidentiary information prior to trial, thereby facilitating settlement). Professor
Brazil observed that the adversarial nature of litigation apparently was disregarded by pro-
ponents of the liberal discovery rules. He concluded that both the adversarial and economic
pressures involved in litigation would inevitably lead to the abuse of the discovery system.
See id.
I See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
5 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).
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tain non-privileged documents.'
In Shelton, the plaintiffs' sixteen-year-old daughter, Colletta
Shelton, was killed in a "roll-over" accident while driving a Jeep
CJ-5 manufactured by the defendant.7 Shelton's parents, as co-ad-
ministrators of her estate, brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging negli-
gence, strict liability, and failure to warn as alternate theories of
recovery.' Shortly after filing suit, the plaintiffs sought to depose
twenty-one individuals employed by American Motors Corporation
("A.M.C."). 9 In response, A.M.C. moved to quash the depositions
but eventually was compelled to produce for examination six of the
initially requested deponents. 1° Following a dispute over whether
these six individuals possessed the specific knowledge or informa-
tion sought by plaintiffs, the district court referred the discovery
proceedings to the United States Magistrate. 1 Ultimately the mag-
istrate allowed plaintiffs to depose additional A.M.C. personnel, in-
cluding its in-house litigation counsel, Rita Burns ("counsel"). 2
I Id. at 1330. After reversing the district court's decision that the information at issue
was not protected by the work product doctrine, the Shelton majority declined to decide
whether the attorney-client privilege was applicable. Id. at 1329. See Shelton v. American
Motors Corp., 106 F.R.D. 490, 494 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (mem.), rev'd, 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.
1986).
Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1324. The defendants, American Motors Corporation, American
Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation [collectively, "A.M.C."] designed, manufac-
tured and marketed the Jeep CJ-5 model involved in this action.
8 See id.
' Id. at 1325. The plaintiffs designated several categories of matters to be examined
pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), which provides in part:
A party may in the party's notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a
public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental
agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examina-
tion is requested. In that event, the organization so named shall designate one or
more officers, directors, or managing agents ... and may set forth, for each person
designated, the matters on which the person will testify.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
" See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1325. A.M.C. moved to quash the depositions of the twenty-
one individuals specifically named and sought a protective order for several of the categories
identified by the plaintiffs under Rule 30(b)(6). Id. The district court required A.M.C. to
produce only six individuals who A.M.C. claimed possessed knowledge of the ten categories
described by the plaintiffs. Id.
" See id. At the deposition of the six individuals, who A.M.C. originally provided under
court order, several of the deponents refused to answer certain questions at the direction of
A.M.C.'s trial counsel, claiming that the information sought was protected either by a privi-
lege or the work product doctrine. See Shelton, 106 F.R.D. at 491. Following the deponents'
refusals to answer, plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment and the district court re-
ferred the discovery proceedings to the United States Magistrate. Id.
12 Id. at 491-92. The magistrate denied the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment, but
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Throughout two depositions, counsel, claiming work product pro-
tection, repeatedly refused to answer questions concerning the ex-
istence or non-existence of certain documents.13 Counsel's refusal
to answer those questions prompted the district court to grant
plaintiffs' motion for default judgment on the issue of liability.14
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, expressing its displeasure with
the growing practice of deposing attorneys,15 reversed the district
ordered A.M.C. to produce additional deponents, including Rita Burns. Id. at 492.
,3 Id. at 492-93. During Burns' first deposition on October 24, 1984, she refused to ac-
knowledge the existence or non-existence of certain documents, including a list of all law-
suits filed against A.M.C. that involved a Jeep CJ-5. Burns also would not comment on the
existence of roll-over propensity tests other than those previously disclosed or whether she
knew of any documents, films, prints or memoranda which had been suppressed for the
purposes of Jeep overturn cases. Id. Similarly, Burns refused to acknowledge the existence
of documents and video tapes of the Jeep Celebrity Challenge Races, computer modeling
data, the intentional destruction of the "McCord" test film, and several other items. Id.
Based on Burns' refusals, plaintiffs again moved for a default judgment. Shelton, 805
F.2d at 1325. The magistrate denied plaintiffs' second motion and directed Burns to appear
for a second deposition at which the magistrate could expeditiously resolve any claims of
privilege or work product that Burns might raise. Id.
During her second deposition, despite being ordered to respond by the magistrate,
counsel continued to refuse to answer questions about the existence or non-existence of vari-
ous documents. Id. at 1325-26.
14 Id. at 1326. On the recommendation of the magistrate, the district court issued an
order directing Burns to answer the questions and show cause why her contemptuous con-
duct should not be subject to sanctions, including default judgment. Id. Notwithstanding
the court's directive, Burns and A.M.C. responded that they would "stand on [their] posi-
tion" and not answer the questions. Id. Judge Waters, in a memorandum opinion, concluded
that neither the attorney client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected Burns'
refusal to answer questions seeking to establish merely the existence of documents. Shelton,
106 F.R.D. at 494-95.
The district court relied on the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Na-
tional Bank v. Cleburne County Bank, 258 Ark. 329, 331, 525 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (1975), to
dispense with defendant's claim of work product protection. See Shelton, 106 F.R.D. at 493-
94. After determining that the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege did not
prohibit inquiry into Burns' knowledge of the existence of documents, the district court
found that the defendant's conduct during the depositions constituted willful contempt and
entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). See id. at 495-
98; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
11 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. Referring to the practice of deposing opposing coun-
sel, the Shelton court stated:
In recent years .... the practice of taking the deposition of opposing counsel
has become.., increasingly popular .... We view... [this] as a negative develop-
ment in the area of litigation ....
Undoubtedly, counsel's task in preparing for trial would be much easier if he
could dispense with interrogatories, document requests, and depositions of lay
persons, and simply depose opposing counsel in an attempt to identify the infor-
mation that opposing counsel has decided is relevant and important to his legal
theories and strategy. The practice .... however, [is] . . . disrupting [to] the
adversial nature of our judicial system.
1987]
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court's holding with respect to the work product doctrine. 6 The
majority held that the work product doctrine did indeed protect
counsel from acknowledging whether or not certain documents
existed. 17
Writing for the Eighth Circuit, Judge Gibson concluded that
the information sought by plaintiffs deserved work product protec-
tion, as counsel's recollection of a specific document's existence
would be reflective of her mental impressions.'8 The court deter-
mined that the seemingly innocuous questions threatened to estab-
lish more than the mere existence or non-existence of documents,
and would result in the improper disclosure of counsel's opinion
work product. 19 Judge Gibson reasoned that because of the volumi-
nous nature of A.M.C.'s files, counsel's knowledge of the existence
of specific documents, if revealed, would be tantamount to expos-
ing her mental process of selection and compilation.2 Additionally,
the court noted that the sanction of default judgment imposed by
the district court was unwarranted since A.M.C. was forced either
Id. at 1327 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 1330. The court asserted that "where ... the deponent is opposing counsel and
has engaged in a selective process of compiling documents from among voluminous files in
preparation for litigation, the mere acknowledgment of the existence of those documents
would reveal counsel's mental impressions, which are protected as work product." Id. at
1326.
17 See id. Discussing the work product doctrine, Judge Gibson stated that an an attor-
ney's "thought processes, opinions, conclusions, and legal theories" all merit work product
protection. See id. at 1328 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); In re Mur-
phy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977)).
18 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329. The court distinguished the case at bar from those
cited by the plaintiffs, see Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 30 F.R.D. 534, 538 (M.D. Tenn.
1962) (knowledge of existence of memoranda not protected as work product); McCall v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (same), in contending that the
existence or non-existence of work product was discoverable by noting that the answers
sought would reveal more than the documents existence. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329.
" See id. The court reasoned that "[under] these circumstances we believe that any
recollection Burns may have of the existence of documents in A.M.C.'s possession likely
would be limited to those .. she has selected as important to her legal theories .... Thus
• . . the questions asked require more than merely acknowledging the existence of certain
documents." Id.
20 Id. The Shelton court noted the importance of an attorney's selection and compila-
tion of documents in cases where a large volume of documents are involved in discovery. Id.
In support of its position that the selection process of an attorney constitutes opinion work
product, the Shelton Court cited the Third Circuit's decision in Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d
312, 316 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985). The Shelton court noted that "Burns'
selective review of A.M.C.'s numerous documents was based upon her professional judgment
of the issues and defenses involved in this case. This mental selective process reflects Burns'
legal theories and thought processes which are protected as work product." Shelton, 805
F.2d at 1329.
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to disobey the district court's orders to answer or to divulge the
knowledge of counsel claimed to be attorney work product.2'
Dissenting, Judge Battey reasoned that neither the work prod-
uct doctrine nor the attorney-client privilege protected counsel's
knowledge of the existence or non-existence of documents.22 Judge
Battey stressed that the majority holding failed to comport with
earlier precedent in the Eighth Circuit23 and would condone the
"stonewalling" strategy in which he felt the defendants had en-
gaged.24 Finally, Judge Battey determined that the defendants'
persistent attempts to avoid and protract the discovery process
constituted a "willful failure," the element required to support the
imposition of Rule 37 sanctions. 5
It is suggested that, in an effort to protect an attorney's com-
plex trial preparation process from unfair discovery tactics, the
Shelton court's decision unjustifiably enlarged the scope of the at-
torney work product doctrine, and, accordingly, will impede the
operation of the federal discovery mechanism. After reviewing the
history of the work product doctrine,26 this Comment will assert
that the Shelton court mischaracterized the underlying nature of
the requested factual information and overemphasized its proba-
tive value regarding counsel's "mental impressions" of the case. In
contrast to the holding in Shelton, this Comment will suggest that
requiring counsel to divulge knowledge of the mere existence or
non-existence of documents will reinforce the strong policy consid-
erations supporting the discovery process without jeopardizing
opinion work product. Finally, this Comment will examine the pos-
sible detrimental effects of the Shelton decision, which, it is sub-
2 See id. at 1329-30, 1330 n.7.
22 See id. at 1331 (Battey, J., dissenting).
23 Id. (Battey, J., dissenting). Judge Battey asserted the privilege claimed here did not
pass the five-point test established in Investors Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1333 (Battey, J., dis-
senting).
24 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1,331 (Battey, J., dissenting). Judge Battey noted that:
[t]his case is replete with evidence of [the defendant's] repeated acts and at-
tempts to avoid the discovery of documents in its possession....
The constant, growing tendency of litigants to frustrate the trial discovery
process such as was done by A.M.C. is dangerous and "chilling" to a process which
is geared toward a search for truth.
Id. (Battey, J., dissenting).
25 See id. (Battey, J., dissenting).
26 See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. See generally Cohn, The Work Prod-
uct Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 917-21 (1983) (review of origins
and development work product doctrine).
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mitted, will dilute the United States District Courts' regulatory
power over discovery proceedings and encourage a reversion to the
common-law system of a trial by surprise."
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The modern discovery system28 provides for pre-trial discovery
of all materials relevant to ensuing litigation which do not fall
within the protection of an established evidentiary privilege.29 The
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor30 held that the public's in-
terest in full disclosure of the facts must yield at some point to the
need to protect the privacy of an attorney's work in preparation
for trial.3 1 However, the work product doctrine as enunciated in
Hickman, did not contemplate the limiting effect on meaningful
27 Cf. Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1028 (1961) (diffi-
culty of reconciling use of work product with "principle of an open proceeding in which
surprise is minimized").
28 Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, see 308 U.S. 645
(1949), parties to an action at law generally were precluded from taking depositions of wit-
nesses and other parties and using interrogatories for discovery purposes. See National
Cash-Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502, 504-05 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 724 (1899);
see also Cohn, supra note 26, at 918 (after procedural merger of law and equity, "the game
of blindman's buff [sic] continued" because litigants only knew contents of pleadings and
bills of particulars). Moreover, state laws allowing for such discovery were preempted by the
federal statutes then in force. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-35 (1940) (recodified and revised by Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869); see also Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 721 (1885)
(New York procedural statute conflicting with federal statute inapplicable); National Cash-
Register, 94 F. at 503-05 (Massachusetts statute prescribing interrogatories inapplicable in
federal court); Developments in the Law, supra note 27, at 950 (liberal state discovery pro-
cedures unavailable to federal litigants).
Parties in need of discovery prior to the Federal Rules could file in equity a bill of
discovery to aid their action at law. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union P.R.R., 240 F. 135,
136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). The equitable bill of discovery was of limited use, however, because
of conflicts over its proper scope. See id.; see generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 5.1 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing bill of discovery in prior equity practice).
Most commentators consider the Federal Rules to have greatly improved federal pre-
trial procedures. See generally 4 J. MOORE & L. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
26.03[3], at 26-73 to -74 (rev. 2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter MOORE'S] (criticizing discovery prac-
tice prior to Federal Rules); Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-trial Procedure,
36 MICH. L. REV. 215, 216-17, 226 (1937) (recognizing inadequacy of trial preparation based
solely on pleadings and advocating adoption of Federal Rules); Developments in the Law,
supra note 27, at 944-50 (surveying the federal law of discovery before and after Federal
Rules were adopted).
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
30 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
s' See id. at 510-11. Writing for the Court, Justice Murphy stated that "[n]ot even the
most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the
mental impressions of an attorney." Id. at 510.
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discovery which would result from the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Shelton.32 The Shelton court assumed that plaintiffs would be able
to secure the factual information needed through other means of
discovery.33 It became apparent, however, that neither plaintiffs
nor the district court were able to acquire the desired information
from A.M.C. during the lengthy course of the discovery proceed-
ings.3 The magistrate purposely allowed plaintiffs to take coun-
sel's deposition following the original deponents' failure to respond
to relevant questions due to their inadequate knowledge or as-
serted privilege.3 5 The Shelton court, by cloaking counsel's knowl-
edge of the document's existence with work product protection,
may have foreclosed the plaintiffs' only alternative method of un-
covering facts necessary to prepare their case. 6 It is submitted
that the Shelton court erroneously identified counsel's knowledge
of the existence or non-existence of documents with the mental
process of sifting through and selecting documents, 7 which has
32 See id. at 507. The Shelton court, however, by holding that in-house counsel's knowl-
edge of such facts was within the ambit of work product protection, denied the plaintiffs
access to relevant facts, namely, the existence or non-existence of documents. See Shelton,
805 F.2d at 1329.
33 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. In Shelton, the Eighth Circuit determined that the
plaintiffs would be able to obtain, or had already obtained, the information sought through
A.M.C. personnel other than in-house counsel Burns. Id. This finding, however, ignored the
fact that A.M.C.'s trial counsel earlier had instructed employees of A.M.C. not to answer
similar questions, which, ironically, eventually led the magistrate to allow Burns to be de-
posed. See id. at 1325.
34 See Shelton, 106 F.R.D. at 497. While discussing the sanction of default judgment,
Judge Waters noted that:
Although defendants argue that the information sought was available to
plaintiffs through other avenues, having considered the materials submitted by
the parties, the court concludes that such attempts were made and were relatively
unsuccessful. The court is satisfied that defendants have "played games" with the
federal discovery process in the course of Jeep CJ rollover litigation. To cite some
minor examples, the court notes that the defendants' engineers have repeatedly
objected to various questions, contending that they do not understand such plain
English terminology as "propensity to roll over." However .... [A.M.C. engineers]
used similar terminology in studies and prepared charts ....
Another example indicates that defendants have disguised rollover testing as
"tire tests" and falsely denied ... that any written documentation of those tests
were made.
Id.
"' See id. at 491-92; supra note 13.
:1 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1328-29; supra note 33.
37 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1328-29. The Eighth Circuit in Shelton agreed with
A.M.C.'s contentions that:
Burns' acknowledgment of the existence of documents referred to by plaintiffs'
counsel would reflect her judgment as an attorney in identifying, examining, and
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been held to be within the scope of the work product doctrine. 8
EXPANSION OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
Federal Rule 26(b)(3)39 represents a codification and attempt-
ed clarification of the work product doctrine.40 It prescribes a
"substantial need" test for the discovery of ordinary tangible work
product which cannot be obtained elsewhere without "undue hard-
ship."'4 1 Further, Rule 26(b)(3) is a reminder that an attorney's
thought processes, opinions, mental impressions and legal theories,
selecting from AMC's voluminous files those documents on which she will rely in
preparing her client's defense in this case. In these circumstances Burns' recollec-
tion of the documents concerning a certain subject will be limited to those docu-
ments she has selected as significant and important with respect to her legal theo-
ries. Therefore .... requiring Burns to testify that she is aware that documents
exist.., is tantamount to requiring her to reveal her legal theories and opinions
concerning that issue.
Id. at 1328.
The court further discussed the process of selection and compilation of documents, not-
ing that an attorney's recollection of selected documents would be likely to indicate the
attorney's theories regarding the case. See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329; see also Sporck v. Peil,
759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.) (attorney's document selection reflects counsel's legal theories
and therefore protected as opinion work product), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); James
Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) (same). The Shelton court's
application of this rationale, however, far surpasses the protection afforded in such cases as
Sporck. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
'" See Sporck, 759 F.2d at 315. In Sporck, however, the documents were selected by
defendant's counsel from among thousands of documents already produced by the defend-
ant during discovery. Id. at 313-14. Therefore, the court deemed discovery of the selection
process itself as lacking any meaningful factual content since the documents themselves had
already been produced. Id. at 316. Indeed, the court in Sporck noted that there were no
allegations that the defendant had failed to produce or intentionally concealed any docu-
ments requested by the plaintiff. Id. at 313.
In Shelton, however, the existence of certain documents had not yet been established.
See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1325-26. It is submitted, therefore, that unlike the process of se-
lecting documents from among those already produced during discovery, the factual knowl-
edge of counsel concerning the existence of documents not yet produced during discovery is
of utmost value, and should clearly be discoverable, where allegations exist that one party
has failed to comply with the discovery process.
3' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); supra note 2.
40 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See generally 4 MooRE's, supra note 28, § 26.63, at 26-
310 to -347. Subdivision (b)(3) was added to Rule 26 to eliminate confusion which had
arisen over the proper showing required for production of trial preparation materials. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), advisory committee's note of 1970.
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); supra note 2. The advisory committee explained that the
new test required a special showing to be made: "substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of [the] case and ... [inability] without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), advisory commit-
tee's note of 1970.
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commonly referred to as opinion work product,42 shall remain invi-
olate absent a showing of rare circumstances. 3 Case law interpret-
ing Rule 26 consistently has declared that the work product doc-
trine does not encompass an attorney's knowledge of the existence
of facts." Departing from this established principle, the Shelton
court asserted that an attorney's recollection of the existence of
documents contained in voluminous files could be used to forecast
such attorney's legal strategy.45 It is submitted, however, that an
attorney's recollection of the existence of documents fails to supply
opposing counsel with more than that fact, as opposing counsel
may only speculate as to whether the document recalled has actu-
ally been selected or simply reviewed and discarded.46 Moreover,
42 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) provides that "the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney . .. concerning the litigation." Id. Thus, under Rule 26(b)(3), the opinion work
product of an attorney must be afforded a higher degree of protection than ordinary tangi-
ble work product. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981); In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977); see generally Wolfson, Opinion Work Product-Solving
the Dilemma of Compelled Disclosure, 64 NEB. L. REv. 248, 255 (1985) (defining boundaries
of opinion work product); Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
760 (1985) (discussing work product doctrine).
43 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1979) (in-
terview memoranda containing opinion work product subject to disclosure); In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) (opinion work product discoverable in "very rare and ex-
traordinary circumstances"); Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 439-40 (D.D.C. 1983) (over-
whelming necessity for information justified revealing opinion work product).
44 See, e.g., Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 30 F.R.D. 534, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1962)
(work product doctrine does not prevent inquiry into existence of work product); McCall v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (work product doctrine does
not protect knowledge of existence of work product itself); see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1199-1200 (D.S.C. 1975) (on reconsideration) (distinguish-
ing creative legal thought from mere recognition of knowledge of observed facts, which is
not protected as work product); Xerox v. I.B.M., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(opinion work product not protected at expense of concealment of non-privileged facts).
Professors Wright and Miller note that:
The courts have consistently held that the work product concept furnishes no
shield against discovery, by interrogatories or by deposition, of the facts that the
adverse party's lawyer has learned, or the persons from whom he has learned such
facts, or the existence or nonexistence of documents, even though the documents
themselves may not be subject to discovery.
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2023, at 194 (1970)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
'5 See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1328-29.
11 It is asserted that the court's statement in Shelton that "any recollection Burns may
have of the existence of documents in AMC's possession likely would be limited to those...
she has selected as important to her legal theories," 805 F.2d at 1329, and "that Burns'
acknowledgment would indicate to her opponent that she had reviewed the document and
... may be relying on it preparing her client's case," id., is indicative of the speculative basis
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after establishing existence, the discovering party may not inquire
further into what significance, if any, counsel has attached to a
specific document. 47 Therefore, the Shelton court, it is suggested,
satisfied its displeasure with the increasingly popular practice of
deposing attorneys by curtailing discovery of essential facts.48 Fur-
thermore, the decision in Shelton blurs the well-settled distinction
between counsel's knowledge of related facts, such as the existence
of documents, which historically has not been considered work
product,49 and counsel's opinion as to such documents, which may
constitute work product if formed with a view towards litigation. °
ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE Shelton DECISION
Although striving to protect the adversial basis of our system
of jurisprudence, the Shelton court expanded the parameters of
work product protection and, alarmingly, aided in the removal of
facts from judicial scrutiny.51 The Eighth Circuit's decision has cir-
cumvented earlier case law defining the scope of the work product
doctrine 52 by aligning knowledge of the existence of underlying
facts concerning trial preparation with the process of selecting and
compiling documents through trained legal analysis.5 3 It is asserted
that the decision in Shelton will serve only to hinder and prolong
the already burdened discovery process by fostering claims of work
product protection relating to nonprivileged knowledge of relevant
facts. The specific purpose of pretrial discovery is to narrow the
issues for trial by compelling parties to disclose such facts. 4 The
supporting the courts finding that the "answers to [the plaintiff's] questions ... would re-
veal more than the mere existence of documents." Id. It is submitted that any slight infer-
ential value that the plaintiffs would receive from Burns' acknowledgment is far outweighed
by the need to establish the existence of such documents.
" See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (attor-
ney's legal theories must be protected from needless interference).
"' See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. It is submitted that the Shelton decision severely
limits the ability to take opposing counsel's deposition by deeming counsel's knowledge of
observed facts to be work product. See id. at 1327, 1328-29.
In Hickman v. Taylor, however, the Supreme Court determined that "[wIhere relevant
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those
facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had." 329 U.S.
at 511.
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 2.
See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1326.
52 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329; see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see generally 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Shelton decision, however, will help reduce the discovery process
to a tactical battle, whereby parties to a lawsuit can avoid disclos-
ing factual information which might expose liability.5 It is further
suggested that the decision in Shelton will undermine the author-
ity of the district courts to moderate the flow of discovery to and
from each party. 6 For an orderly progression of discovery to occur,
the trial court must decide whether information sought is privi-
leged or protected as work product.57 The Shelton decision implic-
itly encourages non-compliance with a district court's orders com-
pelling discovery pending appellate review.58 Thus, it is asserted
that the Shelton decision will provide an added incentive for the
unethical abuse of the discovery process by attorneys and invaria-
bly will result in the waste of judicial resources by requiring appel-
late review of matters rightfully within the discretion of the trial
court.5 9
CONCLUSION
The discovery of facts is essential to the proper functioning of
note 44, § 2001, at 15 (explaining purpose of discovery mechanism).
"I Cf. Brazil, supra note 3, at 1311-15 (proponents of liberal discovery rules failed to
appraise the psychological pressures inherent in adversarial system); Comment, Tactical
Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 125-38 (1949)
(discussion of other abuses of discovery process).
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Under Rule 37(b), a district court may impose sanctions
against parties who fail to abide by the discovery process contained in Rules 26-36. FED. R.
Civ. P. 37(b); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37, advisory committee's general note of 1970 (failure
to afford discovery sufficient for sanctions).
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Under Rule 26(c), a district court may upon motion by a
party or person from whom discovery is sought fashion a protective order which justly pro-
tects that party's interests. Id. The court, in its discretion, may deny such party's motion, in
whole or in part, and order discovery of the materials for which protection was sought. Id.
These orders by a district court are interlocutory and therefore not appealable before final
judgment has been rendered. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargos, 723 F.2d 1461,
1465 (3d Cir. 1983) (denial of motion to quash held to be non-appealable); see generally 4-8
MOORE's, supra note 28, §§ 26-83[3] (discovery orders not ordinarily appealable before final
judgment entered).
5' Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1331 (Battey, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Battey opined
that "[t]he ability of the court [to use and threaten sanctions] in a given case, properly
supported by the appellate court, contributes greatly to the prompt resolution of the many
cases facing the federal trial courts." Id. (Battey, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Battey
noted that "the majority opinion will provide added incentive to... counsel to hide from
judicial scrutiny otherwise discoverable documents." Id. at 1333 (Battey, J., dissenting).
11 See supra note 57. It is asserted that the defiant position taken by the defendant's
and upheld by the court in Shelton, will force district courts to impose sanctions. In effect,
this will vitiate the courts' discretion as to the issuance of protective orders and force appel-
late review of the ultimate sanction imposed.
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our civil trial system. The Shelton decision, however, distorts the
traditional boundaries between the work product of an attorney
and the underlying non-privileged facts which often become inter-
twined with such work product. While the nature of the adver-
sarial system dictates that attorneys prepare their cases free from
intrusion by opposing counsel, no such protection is justified when
it results in the suppression of essential facts.
Michael F. Sweeney
